

STATELESSNESS AND REGIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE ROHINGYA CRISIS, THAILAND'S ROLE, AND ASEAN'S RESPONSE*

William J. Jones

Mahidol University International College, Thailand

Corresponding Author's Email: william.jon@mahidol.ac.th

Received 21 January 2026; Revised 10 March 2026; Accepted 12 March 2026

Abstract

This research analyzes the protracted statelessness and systemic persecution of the Rohingya people, situating the 2016–2017 humanitarian crisis within the broader historical context of Myanmar's exclusionary 1982 Citizenship Law. By applying Max Weber's sociological framework on nationality and cultural prestige, the paper elucidates the mechanisms of social closure used to delegitimize Rohingya identity within Myanmar. The central argument focuses on the critical yet often overlooked role of Thailand as a secondary actor; the study highlights how Thailand's current classification of Rohingya as illegal immigrants—rather than refugees—exacerbates their vulnerability to indefinite detention, human trafficking, and exploitation within the informal economy. Additionally, the paper critiques the diplomatic inertia of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), positing that the rigid adherence to the regional principle of non-interference has impeded effective humanitarian intervention. Ultimately, the author advocates for a paradigm shift in Thai policy towards the

Citation:



*

William J. Jones. (2026). Statelessness And Regional Responsibility: The Rohingya Crisis, Thailand's Role, And Asean's Response. *Modern Academic Development and Promotion Journal*, 4(4), 601-620.;

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.>

<https://so12.tci-thaijo.org/index.php/MADPIADP/>

formalization of refugee status, arguing that legal integration would not only uphold international human rights standards but also allow the Rohingya to contribute meaningfully to Thailand's workforce.

Keywords: Rohingya, Human Rights, ASEAN Human Rights, AICHR, Thailand

Introduction

The Rohingya are a widely publicized ethnic group indigenous to the Rakhine state in Myanmar. Current estimates suggest that between 1.5 and 2 million Rohingya reside in Western Myanmar and across the border in neighboring Bangladesh. The United Nations has characterized the Rohingya as some of the most persecuted people in the world. This persecution garnered significant attention in the West following the crisis of 2016–2017. This period highlighted the severity of the situation and the failure of Burmese State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi to acknowledge the gravity of the events. Despite international outcry, Suu Kyi downplayed reports of ethnic cleansing. Her reluctance to support the Rohingya or recognize the unfolding humanitarian crisis occurred during a critical period for Myanmar, coinciding with anticipated general elections. It is believed that her silence was a calculated political maneuver to consolidate support, resulting in a significant loss of respect on the international stage.

While the 2016 crisis precipitated a mass exodus of thousands of Rohingya into Thailand, migration into the country has existed for decades. Early migrants successfully integrated, establishing small businesses and marrying into the Thai-Muslim community in the south. However, the recent influx of refugees fleeing acute persecution has triggered strict government crackdowns. Thai officials currently monitor the Rohingya closely, detaining them in centers where they are often separated from family members and subjected to substandard living conditions.

This paper posits that while the Rohingya crisis is primarily a domestic issue for Myanmar, Thailand plays a critical secondary role. It argues that Thailand should revise its stance to recognize the Rohingya as refugees. Given the dehumanization they face in their home country, Thailand should assist in processing legal documentation, thereby allowing the Rohingya to contribute beneficially to Thailand's workforce and economy. This paper will examine the origins of the crisis, the impact of statelessness on citizenship, Thailand's role in the marginalization of the Rohingya, and the response or lack thereof from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Literature Review

The existing literature regarding the Rohingya can be categorized into four sub-topics: 1) The History of Rakhine State and the Rohingya People; 2) Myanmar's political stance; 3) Persecution; and 4) Refugee status.

The etymology of the term "Rohingya" is complex. Its current spelling is generally traced to the 1960s; prior to this, the group was referred to as Rwangya, Roewengya, and Ruhangya. The term "Rwangya" was utilized primarily by the British during the 1940s and 1950s (Leider, 2018a). The year 1947 was pivotal for South Asia, marking the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan on August 14, followed by Myanmar's (formerly Burma) independence from British rule on January 4, 1948 (Leider, 2018a; Ansar, 2020). Leider (2018b) reports that a large Muslim community with historical roots in Bengal relocated to North Arakan during this era.

The 1947 Panglong Agreement granted political and financial autonomy to ethnic minorities such as the Shan, Kachin, and Chin. However, despite Myanmar officially recognizing 135 ethnic groups, the Rohingya were excluded. Their religious distinctiveness was insufficient for ethnic recognition, a stance reinforced by opposition from Rakhine Buddhists who rejected the concept of a

separate Muslim Rakhine zone (Kolås, 2025; Leider, 2018b; Mohajan, 2018). Green (2013) notes that the then-Chair of the New National Democracy Party explained the 1982 Citizenship Law as a mechanism to prevent those with “mixed blood” from influencing the country's political decisions (Cheeseman, 2017).

The Rohingya are predominantly located in the Rakhine state in western Myanmar. Their statelessness stems from the Burmese government's refusal to acknowledge them as citizens, categorizing them instead as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh (Rahman & Mohajan, 2019). Consequently, Bangladesh has become the primary destination for asylum seekers due to shared religious beliefs and Bangladesh's recognition of the humanitarian needs of displaced persons (Habib et al., 2018).

From a political perspective, Yegar (2018) argues that the Rohingya have failed to gain a political voice in Myanmar. Seventy years after the inception of the 'Rohingya Movement,' it remains unclear if the movement is progressing or has failed politically, as militants have not achieved the goal of an autonomous Muslim state. Jones (2017) uses Galtung's triangle of violence and argues that the precarious environment is multidimensional, beginning with the 1982 Citizenship Law and continuing through restrictions on marriage and travel, exacerbated by social movements such as the MaBaTa of Rakhine's Buddhists. This exclusion is comparable to historical examples of systemic discrimination, such as apartheid in South Africa or the treatment of Black Americans during the era of slavery.

Kaewkuekoonkit and Chantavanich (2018) highlight the challenges Rohingya face upon arriving in Thailand, including threats of arrest by immigration police. Coddington (2023) examines early persecution, noting that the Rohingya are not recognized as refugees in Thailand, as the government ceased processing refugees from Myanmar in 2004. In Bangladesh, over 800,000 Rohingya live in makeshift camps, requiring urgent humanitarian intervention (Islam & Nuzhath, 2018). Ahsan Ullah (2016) emphasizes that the 1982 Citizenship Law prevents

Rohingya from filing for citizenship due to a lack of documentation. This lack of status results in a denial of protection under international human rights laws, including guaranteed access to food and medical supplies (Uddin, 2015).

Methodology

This study utilizes a qualitative meta-analysis and review of secondary source materials to investigate the protracted statelessness of the Rohingya people. The research design is specifically constructed to synthesize historical, legal, and political data into a cohesive narrative that explains the mechanisms of systemic exclusion. By examining the intersection of domestic legislation in Myanmar and the regional diplomatic norms of Southeast Asia, the study identifies the structural causes of displacement. The research evaluates primary legal texts, including the 1982 Myanmar Citizenship Law and the 1979 Thai Immigration Act, alongside contemporary academic scholarship to map the legal landscape of the crisis.

The data collection process follows a multi-stage screening approach. In the first stage, historical accounts of the Rakhine state are analyzed to establish the origins of the ethnic group and the evolution of their identity. The second stage involves reviewing contemporary political reports from international organizations, such as the United Nations and Human Rights Watch, to document the human rights situation and the conditions of displacement. In the third stage, academic journals from the fields of sociology and international relations provide the theoretical grounding for the study. The methodology prioritizes sources that offer empirical evidence regarding the living conditions in refugee camps and detention centers across Bangladesh and Thailand.

The analytical approach is rooted in historical comparative research. By comparing the integration of early Rohingya migrants with the treatment of modern refugees, the study highlights a significant shift in Thai policy from

assimilation to securitization. Furthermore, the methodology incorporates a critical analysis of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and its institutional mechanisms. It evaluates the effectiveness of regional diplomatic norms, specifically the principle of non-interference and the consensus-based decision-making process, in managing humanitarian crises. The study assesses how these principles limit the mandate of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, preventing it from investigating or reporting on violations.

The methodology also employs a thematic synthesis to explore concepts such as statelessness, human trafficking, and institutional paralysis. This allows for a comprehensive understanding of the crisis that transcends national borders. Central to this analysis is the application of the Weberian theory of social closure and cultural prestige. This theoretical framework is used to examine how the 1982 Citizenship Law serves as a tool for exclusionary closure by setting a historical threshold for belonging that many Rohingya cannot document. The study further analyzes how linguistic and religious markers are weaponized to reinforce the status of the Rohingya as an out-group. Finally, the use of verified references and academic citations ensures that the findings are situated within the broader scholarly discourse on forced migration and ethnic conflict in Southeast Asia.

Framework of Analysis

The primary framework of analysis for this study is the Weberian theory of social closure and cultural prestige. Max Weber posited that social groups seek to maximize their advantages by restricting access to resources and status to a limited circle of eligible (Alatas, 1963). This process of social closure is achieved by identifying specific social or physical characteristics, such as common descent or shared language, as criteria for exclusion. In the context of Myanmar, the state

utilizes legal and cultural mechanisms to enact exclusionary closure against the Rohingya.

Weber argued that for a group to maintain a sense of national identity, it must possess cultural prestige derived from common descent (Weber, 1978). In Myanmar, this prestige is reserved for the 135 recognized indigenous ethnic groups. The Rohingya are systematically excluded from this category, as the state labels them as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh (Rahman & Mohajan, 2019). By framing the Rohingya as outsiders who lack the necessary historical and cultural roots to belong to the Burmese nation, the state justifies their disenfranchisement.

This framework explains the importance of the 1982 Citizenship Law as a tool for social closure. The law creates a hierarchy of citizenship that privileges those who can prove ancestry in Myanmar prior to the British colonial intervention of 1823. By setting the threshold for belonging at a historical point that many Rohingya cannot document, the state effectively shuts the door on their legal recognition. This is a classic example of Weberian closure, where a dominant group uses legislation to monopolize the benefits of citizenship and state protection (Rhoads, 2022).

Weber also highlighted the role of language and customs in defining the boundaries of a national community. The Rohingya speak a distinct dialect related to Bengali, which the Myanmar government uses as evidence of their foreignness. During the 2014 census, the state refused to recognize the term Rohingya, forcing individuals to register as Bengali to appease nationalist sentiments (Albert & Maizland, 2015). This linguistic othering is a deliberate strategy to strip the group of its unique identity and subsume them under a foreign label, thereby reinforcing their status as a pariah group.

The framework further analyzes how religious identity contributes to social closure. In a nation where Buddhist nationalism is a powerful political

force, the Muslim identity of the Rohingya serves as a visible marker of difference. Groups like the MaBaTa have weaponized this difference to portray the Rohingya as a threat to the cultural integrity of the Buddhist majority (Jones, 2017). Through this lens, the persecution of the Rohingya is not just a political conflict but a sociological effort to maintain the cultural prestige of the in-group by removing the perceived out-group.

Statelessness: Precariousness of an Extreme Nature

As of 2020, 900,000 Rohingya refugees were located in a single camp in Bangladesh, making them the largest group of encamped refugees in the world (Human Rights Watch, 2020). Statelessness has left the Rohingya facing severe conditions in makeshift camps across South and Southeast Asia (Cheung, 2011). While estimates suggest between 3,000 and 20,000 Rohingya reside in Thailand, the lack of official data renders them virtually invisible and highly vulnerable to human rights violations.

The rejection of the Rohingya by Myanmar can be analyzed through the theoretical framework of Max Weber. In his discussion on ‘Nationality and Cultural Prestige,’ Weber states that to be ‘distinctively common,’ a group must derive from ‘common descent.’ He cites Serbians and Croatians as examples of groups sharing common descent but not nationality (Mentzel, 2025). Weber further argues that a common language is insufficient to sustain national identity, emphasizing the importance of shared customs or ‘sensual culture.’

In Myanmar, the marginalization of the Rohingya excludes them from any sense of cultural prestige or ‘Burmese’ identity. The Rohingya speak a distinct dialect, an Eastern Indo-Aryan language related to Bengali and the Chittagong dialect. The 2014 Myanmar census refused to recognize the Muslim population in Rakhine, forcing them to register as ‘Bengali’ to appease Buddhist nationalists (Albert, 2017). Weber’s discussion of racial factors in national belonging citing the

historical exclusion of Black Americans mirrors the Rohingya experience. Unlike the eventual integration seen in the US, the Rohingya remain unclaimed by any nation, oscillating between Myanmar and Bangladesh.

Thailand's Role in the Crisis

Thailand has emerged as a key transit and destination country for Rohingya refugees. However, its stance is consistent with other regional actors like Malaysia and Indonesia; it has not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention nor the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (Chambers, 2015; Wongratch et al., 2020). Consequently, all arrivals are subject to the 1979 Immigration Act, which requires valid documentation—something the Rohingya lack.

Without legal status, Rohingya migrants cannot obtain work permits, forcing them into the informal labor sector where they are susceptible to abuse (Chantavanich, 2015). A case study by Hayeemad and Buasri (2015) in Khon Kaen, Northeast Thailand, reveals that many Rohingya enter via the Mae Sot and Tak provinces. Unlike other Burmese migrants, long-term Rohingya residents in Khon Kaen often speak, read, and write Thai. One interviewee stated:

“I was oppressed from Myanmar military while I lived there, so I had to use fake passport to come to Thailand in 1988 by Maesod border... I had to pay THB 1,500 to agent for get the job and owed the employer THB 5,000... I could pay the debt within 6 months and moved to Khon Kaen for sale roti” (Bangkok Post, 2015).

This evidence suggests that despite the hardships, many refugees prefer the uncertainty of Thailand to the persecution in Myanmar.

Rohingya smuggled across the Andaman Sea into Southern Thailand face severe risks. Reports indicate that Thai officials have previously sold refugees from detention camps to human traffickers in the deep south (Chaijaroenwatana and Haque, 2020; The New Humanitarian, 2014; Wongratch et al., 2020). Detainees are held until relatives pay ransoms (\$2,000) or are sold into forced labor for approximately 50,000 baht per person (Szep & Marshall, 2013). Overcrowding in detention centers led Thailand to separate families and attempt diplomatic deportation negotiations with Myanmar (Boonlert, 2019). However, Myanmar's refusal to accept responsibility left Thailand with few options, exacerbating the trafficking cycle.

ASEAN: The Paralysis of the 'ASEAN Way'

Earlier in this paper, the history of the Rohingya's statelessness and Thailand's domestic response were examined. However, to fully understand the persistence of the crisis, one must analyze the role of the regional governing body, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). While ASEAN positions itself as a central pillar of regional stability, its response to the Rohingya crisis has been characterized by diplomatic inertia and structural paralysis. It is imperative to discuss how the organization's foundational principles specifically the "ASEAN Way" and the limitations of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) have hindered an effective response.

The primary obstacle to a cohesive regional response is the 'ASEAN Way', a set of diplomatic norms emphasizing informal consultation, consensus-building, and, most critically, non-interference in the internal affairs of member states (Leviter, 2010). While the ASEAN Charter contains a legally binding commitment to 'respect for and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms', in practice, the principle of non-interference supersedes these humanitarian obligations and are embedded in AICHR's Terms of Reference. AICHR's ToR do

not allow for monitoring, investigation and reporting. This structural configuration of AICHR is mirrored on ASEAN principles and explains the inability for AICHR to act collectively in even issuing the mildest of statements concerning the Rohingya (Jones, 2024a; Jones, 2025). This principle, originally designed to prevent Cold War-era conflicts between member states, effectively shields regimes from accountability for domestic atrocities.

In the context of the Rohingya, Myanmar has successfully leveraged this principle to frame the crisis as a purely domestic ‘counter-terrorism’ operation, thereby precluding formal intervention by its neighbors (Piromya, 2021). Because ASEAN decision-making requires consensus, Myanmar and often allied states with their own internal human rights sensitivities can effectively veto any robust collective action. This structural reality forces ASEAN to dilute its official statements, avoiding the term ‘Rohingya’ to appease the Myanmar government and instead utilizing euphemisms such as ‘irregular migration’ or ‘humanitarian situation in Rakhine State’ (Chambers, 2015).

Consequently, ASEAN has resorted to “quiet diplomacy” or “constructive engagement” a strategy premised on the belief that maintaining friendly relations will eventually yield influence. However, this approach has arguably failed. ASEAN members act largely on Myanmar’s assurances regarding conditions on the ground. For instance, “ASEAN Plus Three” nations (China, South Korea, and Japan) have donated aid to support repatriation efforts South Korea and Indonesia notably contributing \$500,000 each (Chambers, 2015). Yet, without independent access to verify safety in Rakhine state, this aid addresses symptoms rather than root causes. Unless the fundamental issues of citizenship, freedom of movement, and accountability are resolved, repatriation remains a dangerous impossibility (Changrui & Lee, 2023; Umar, 2021).

The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) was established in 2009 as the region's overarching human rights body. Ideally, the

AICHR should serve as the primary mechanism for addressing the refugee crisis (Jetschke, 2015). However, its Terms of Reference reveal a critical flaw: the AICHR is designed primarily for the promotion of human rights, not their protection. It lacks the mandate to investigate violations, receive individual complaints, or enforce standards (Jones, 2025; Thamrin, 2018).

This limitation is evident in the Commission's silence. Since its inception, the AICHR has systematically avoided formally addressing the Rohingya situation. During seminars held in Myanmar in 2014, for example, safe topics like environmental issues were prioritized while the persecution of the Rohingya was excluded from the agenda (Gamez, 2017). The paralysis of the body was starkly illustrated when a Brunei representative attempted to raise the Rohingya issue at an AICHR meeting; the initiative was blocked by a majority of representatives who argued it constituted an "internal issue" outside the Commission's purview (Gamez, 2017).

It must be noted that whilst the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights has never acted directly or indirectly there has been movement within AICHR and ASEAN. Former representatives of AICHR have issued statements of concern and called for action to assist Rohingya and hinting at forcing Myanmar authorities to open up about the situation in Myanmar and provide access to Rakhine state (Septiari, 2018). However, these calls from former Indonesian and Malaysian AICHR representatives was done in the capacity of private citizens and outside of AICHR.

This is a very important distinction in that collective action of AICHR would carry significant moral and institutional authority whereas individual action does not carry the same weight of the ASEAN or AICHR collective (Jones, 2024b). Jetschke (2019) has also investigated and found that externalities of the Rohingya crisis, namely, massive influxes of refugees and the attendant costs of housing and other humanitarian measures led to Malaysia breaking from ASEAN norms and actively calling for an end to state practices in Myanmar against the Rohingya.

An important distinction needs to be made in that Thailand also faced similar security concerns but chose not to actively voice criticism of Myanmar authorities and call for investigations in a public manner (Shivakoti, 2025). It is counterfactual to consider whether Malaysia would have broken ASEAN norms and called for action against another ASEAN member state if they had not been subject to migration related external cost. The fact still remains that Malaysia broke with tried and true ASEAN norms by openly and publicly criticizing Myanmar for actions against the Rohingya, an internal issue to Myanmar.

The inability of ASEAN to act as a bloc has led to fractured individual responses. Muslim-majority nations such as Malaysia and Indonesia have occasionally broken with the tradition of silence to condemn the violence, driven by domestic political pressure and religious solidarity. However, even these nations remain constrained by the need to preserve ASEAN unity. As Hazmi et al. (2025) argue, the lack of institutional strength to resolve this crisis threatens ASEAN's credibility, suggesting the organization is incapable of managing complex humanitarian disasters that spill across borders. Until ASEAN reinterprets non-interference to allow for intervention in cases of gross human rights violations, its response will remain limited to humanitarian tokenism rather than political resolution.

Conclusion

The plight of the Rohingya represents one of the most enduring and severe crises of statelessness in the modern era. As this paper has demonstrated, the crisis is not merely a byproduct of the 2016–2017 military crackdowns, but the cumulative result of decades of systemic exclusion, legal disenfranchisement via the 1982 Citizenship Law, and profound “othering” by the Burmese state. By applying Max Weber’s theoretical framework, we observe how the denial of “common descent” and “cultural prestige” has been weaponized to strip the

Rohingya of their political voice and social legitimacy, effectively rendering them invisible within their own homeland.

While the primary responsibility for this dehumanization lies with the military and political leadership of Myanmar, this analysis highlights that the burden of response extends beyond its borders. Thailand, as a key transit and destination state, occupies a critical position in this humanitarian landscape. The current policy of treating Rohingya arrivals as illegal economic migrants rather than refugees drives them into the shadows of the informal economy and the hands of human trafficking networks.

This paper argues that such an approach is not only a humanitarian failing but a strategic misstep. By refusing to process legal documentation or grant refugee status, Thailand perpetuates a cycle of detention and vulnerability that burdens state resources while denying the potential economic contributions of a willing workforce.

Furthermore, the failure of ASEAN and the AICHR to address this crisis underscores the severe limitations of the “ASEAN Way”. The rigid adherence to the principle of non-interference has proven ill-suited for a crisis of this magnitude, allowing member states to prioritize diplomatic comfort over fundamental human rights. However, where regional mechanisms have faltered, the international legal community has begun to intervene. The ongoing proceedings at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in *The Gambia v. Myanmar* mark a watershed moment in the pursuit of accountability. By formally examining allegations of genocide, the ICJ challenges the culture of impunity that has long shielded Myanmar’s military and serves as a direct rebuttal to the denials of ethnic cleansing previously articulated by state leadership.

Ultimately, while the ICJ case offers a vital pathway toward long-term justice and historical truth, the judicial process is inherently slow. The Rohingya cannot wait for a final verdict to receive basic protection. Therefore, a paradigm shift at the regional level remains imperative. Thailand and other ASEAN nations

must pivot from policies of deterrence to policies of protection. Recognizing the Rohingya as refugees and formalizing their status is not merely a charitable act; it is a necessary legal and ethical evolution required to stabilize the region and restore dignity to a people who have been systematically denied it for too long.

References

- Ahsan Ullah, A. K. M. (2016). Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar. *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice*, 32(3), 285–301. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1043986216660811>.
- Alatas, S. F. (1963). The Weber Thesis and South East Asia. *Archives de Sociologie Des Religions*, 15(1), 21–34. <https://doi.org/10.3406/assr.1963.1719>
- Albert , E., & Maizland, L. (2015, June 17). The Rohingya Crisis. *Council on Foreign Relations*. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/rohingya-crisis>
- Ansar, A. (2020). The Unfolding of Belonging, Exclusion and Exile: A Reflection on the History of Rohingya Refugee Crisis in Southeast Asia. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 40(3), 441–456. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2020.1819126>.
- Bangkok Post. (2015, February 10). *Escaping the chains of oppression*. <https://www.bangkokpost.com/life/social-and-lifestyle/476384/escaping-the-chains-of-oppression>.
- Boonlert, T. (2019, November 5). *Thailand can “do more” for Rohingya*. <https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/1787449/thailand-can-do-more-for-rohingya>.
- Chaijaroenwatana, B., & Haque, M. M. (2020). Displaced Rohingya and Concern for Non-traditional Security Risks in Thailand. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 47(3), 201–225. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00927678.2020.1763537>.

- Chambers, P. (2015, October 23). *Thailand Must End Its Own Rohingya Atrocity*. The Diplomat. <https://thediplomat.com/2015/10/thailand-must-end-its-own-rohingya-atrocity/>.
- Changrui, Y., & Lee, B. T. F. (2023). ASEAN in the Conflict Management of the Rohingya Crisis. *Journal of Autonomy and Security Studies*, 7(1), 39–60. <https://jass.journal.fi/article/download/142892/90319/322484>.
- Chantavanich, S. (2015, May 7). *How the Rohingya crisis came to Thailand*. Bangkok Post. <https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/553763/how-the-rohingya-crisis-came-to-thailand>.
- Cheesman, N. (2017). How in Myanmar “National Races” Came to Surpass Citizenship and Exclude Rohingya. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 47(3), 461–483. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2017.1297476>.
- Cheung, S. (2011). Migration Control and the Solutions Impasse in South and Southeast Asia: Implications from the Rohingya Experience. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 25(1), 50–70. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fer048>.
- Coddington, K. (2023). The everyday erosion of refugee claims: Representations of the Rohingya in Thailand. *Social & Cultural Geography*, 24(2), 274–291. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14649365.2021.1939125>.
- Gamez, K. R. (2017). *Examining the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR): The Case Study of the Rohingya Crisis* [LLM Thesis]. <http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=142893>.
- Green, P. (2013). Islamophobia: Burma’s racist fault-line. *Race & Class*, 55(2), 93–98. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0306396813497884>.
- Habib, M., Jubba, C., Rahman, M., & Henri Pallard. (2018). *Forced Migration of Rohingya: The Untold Experience*. Ontario International Development Agency.
- Hayeemad, M., & Buasri, R. (2015). Impact of the AEC on Migrant Workers: A Case Study of the Rohingya in Khon Kaen Thailand. *Journal of Asian Development*, 1(1), 23. <https://doi.org/10.5296/jad.v1i1.7928>.

- Hazmi, A., Yilmaz, M., & Badruzaman, I. (2025). The Responsibility to Protect in Normative Deadlock: ASEAN' Dilemma in the Rohingya Issue. *Journal of Social Politics and Governance*, 7(2), 159–182. file:///C:/Users/MUIC/Downloads/THE+RESPONSIBILITY+TO+PROTECT+IN+NORMATIVE+DEADLOCK+--ASEAN%E2%80%99S+DILEMMA+IN+THE+ROHINGYA+ISSUE.pdf.
- Human Rights Watch. (2020, October 8). *Myanmar: Mass Detention of Rohingya in Squalid Camps*. Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/10/08/myanmar-mass-detention-rohingya-squalid-camps>.
- Islam, M. M., & Nuzhath, T. (2018). Health risks of Rohingya refugee population in Bangladesh: a call for global attention. *Journal of Global Health*, 8(2), 020309. <https://doi.org/10.7189/jogh.08.020309>.
- Jetschke, A. (2015). Why Create a Regional Human Rights Regime? The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission for Human Rights. In T. A. Börzel & V. van Hüllen (Eds.), *Governance Transfer by Regional Organizations. Governance and Limited Statehood Series* (pp. 107–124). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137385642_6.
- Jetschke, A. (2019). Does forced migration increase regional human rights commitment? The cases of Malaysia and Thailand in ASEAN. *Asia Pacific Business Review*, 25(5), 705–728. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13602381.2019.1652981>.
- Jones, W. J. (2017). Myanmar's Rohingya: Human Rights Abuses and Systemic Violence. *Journal of Urban Culture Research*, 14(1), 16–33. <https://doi.org/10.58837/chula.jucr.14.1.3>.
- Jones, W. J. (2024a). ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation . *East Asia Forum*. <https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1732788000>
- Jones, W. J. (2024b). Not much to celebrate on AICHR's 15th anniversary. *East Asia Forum*. <https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1719050400>.

- Jones, W. J. (2025). Sovereignty Over Rights? Realism and Regime Theory Analysis of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights. *Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law*, 26(3), 227–256. <https://doi.org/10.1163/15718158-20252003>.
- Kaewkuekoonkit, A., & Chantavanich, S. (2018). Rohingya in Thailand: Existing social protection in dynamic circumstances. *Asian Review*, 31(1), 5–22. <https://so01.tci-thaijo.org/index.php/arv/article/view/224444>.
- Kolås, Å. (2025). Rohingya identity, nationhood and the census. *Social Identities*, 31(4), 420–439. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13504630.2025.2459075>.
- Leider, J. P. (2018a). History and Victimhood: Engaging with Rohingya Issues. *Insight Turkey*, 20(1), 99–118. <https://doi.org/10.25253/99.2018201.07>.
- Leider, J. P. (2018b). Rohingya: The History of a Muslim Identity in Myanmar. In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History*. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277727.013.115>.
- Leviter, L. (2010). The ASEAN Charter. ASEAN Failure or member failure? *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics*, 43(4), 159–210. <https://nyujilp.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/43.1-Leviter.pdf>.
- Mentzel, P. C. (2025). Max Weber and Anthony D. Smith on Race, Ethnicity, and Nation. *Genealogy*, 9(1), 15–15. <https://doi.org/10.3390/genealogy9010015>.
- Mohajan, H. K. (2018). History of Rakhine State and the Origin of the Rohingya Muslims. *IKAT: The Indonesian Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 2(1), 19–46. <https://doi.org/10.22146/ikat.v2i1.37391>.
- Piromya, K. (2021, September 4). *ASEAN Must Do More to Help the Rohingyas*. The Diplomat. <https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/asean-must-do-more-to-help-the-rohingyas/>.

- Rahman, M., & Mohajan, H. K. (2019). Rohingya-The Stateless Community Becoming the Lost Generation. *Journal of Economic Development, Environment and People*, 8(2), 24-36. <https://doi.org/10.26458/jedep.v8i2.621> .
- Rhoads, E. L. (2022). Citizenship denied, deferred and assumed: a legal history of racialized citizenship in Myanmar. *Citizenship Studies*, 27(1), 1–21. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2022.2137468>.
- Septiari, D. (2018, April 23). AICHR reps call for regional approach to Rohingya crisis. The Jakarta Post. <https://www.thejakartapost.com/seasia/2018/04/23/aichr-reps-call-for-regional-approach-to-rohingya-crisis.html>.
- Shivakoti, R. (2025, March 17). ASEAN’s role in the Rohingya refugee crisis - Forced Migration Review. Forced Migration Review. <https://www.fmreview.org/latinamerica-caribbean/shivakoti/>.
- Szep, J., & Marshall, A. (2013). *Thailand’s clandestine Rohingya policy uncovered*. Reuters. [http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/13/12/ROHINGYA-THAILAND . pdf](http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/13/12/ROHINGYA-THAILAND.pdf).
- Thamrin, H. (2018). Rohingya-Myanmar Crisis: How Is ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights? *International Affairs and Global Strategy*, 63, 19–27. <https://www.iiste.org/Journals/index.php/IAGS/article/view/41858/43103>.
- The New Humanitarian. (2014, February 28). “Hell is real for the Rohingyas in Thailand.” ReliefWeb. <https://reliefweb.int/report/thailand/hell-real-rohingyas-thailand>.
- Uddin, N. (2015). State of Stateless People: The Plight of Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh. In R. E. Howard-Hassmann & M. Walton-Roberts (Eds.), *The Human Right to Citizenship: Slippery Citizenship* (pp. 62–77). University of Pennsylvania Press. <https://doi.org/10.9783/9780812291421-005>.

- Umar, A. R. M. (2014). Making ASEAN Works in Rakhine: A Southeast Asian Perspective. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2488464>.
- Weber, M. (1978). *Economy and society: an Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. University of California Press.
- Wongratch, T., Abdullah, K., & Ismail, M. B. (2020). Deciphering a Strategy to Combat Reiterating Human Trafficking Gangs: A Case Study of the Rohingya Minority in Southern Thailand. *South Asian Journal of Social Studies and Economics*, 7(4), 1–10. <https://doi.org/10.9734/sajsse/2020/v7i430195>.
- Yegar, M. (2018). The Plight of the Rohingya in Myanmar. *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs*, 12(2), 197–207. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23739770.2018.1515713>.